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Introduction
In past decades the question of efﬁ ciency has been a central issue in public law literature. 
The current public policy rhetoric also greatly emphasizes the importance of an efﬁ cient 
state and of efﬁ cient public administration. But do we actually know what expectations 
efﬁ ciency makes towards organizations in the public sphere?
Efﬁ ciency, as an abstract concept, is of American roots and carries various meanings. 
Business enterprises are usually considered efﬁ cient when they manage to achieve the 
largest output with the smallest input, then being the most proﬁ table. In public administration 
efﬁ ciency is not deﬁ ned in terms of proﬁ tability, but of accomplishing the goals set.
American literature considers public administration as efﬁ cient when it manages to 
drain the least resources from economy, which is a fundamental condition for market 
mechanisms to be implemented to their fullest. The American approach deeply believes in 
the omnipotence of the market and thus sees a close correlation between market institutions 
and economic efﬁ ciency.
Beyond the realization of market mechanisms, however, the inﬂ uence of public 
administration exerts on economic processes through economic policy, competition 
supervision, regulations, etc. is neither ancillary. Even in the most liberal economies, the 
state tends to extensively interfere into economic processes to avert market failure. Yet, in 
return, the state also has to live up to wide ranging efﬁ ciency expectations, such as expert 
government, a high standard of legal regulations, the application of business principles, 
the managerial approach, the absence of red tape in law application, low administrative 
burdens, etc. 
A question arising with respect to our theme is what relationship is there between the 
utilization of public money, the management of state property, or collectively termed: 
administering public wealth and economic efﬁ ciency. 
There is general consensus in public administration literature regarding the state being 
justiﬁ ed to intervene in economic processes in order to eliminate market failures. As far as 
state property is concerned, no such expressed market failures may arise, since the most 
beneﬁ t that maintaining public utility companies and public services in state ownership 
offers is the provision of better access to public services. Similarly, the utilization of public 
money is also in the service of an economic cause, namely facilitating that the state, through 
an efﬁ cient utilization of resources drained from the economy, may be able to discharge its 
responsibilities at the lowest cost while meeting the highest standards.
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An overview of the current practice of developed market economies clearly 
demonstrates that there is still no consensus regarding what the optimal ratio of state 
property is, what regulations ought to govern the management of public money, or in other 
words which state assets are to be retained in state ownership, and which, along what 
guidelines and what procedures are to be privatized, furthermore what institutions would be 
best suited to enforce efﬁ ciency requirements when utilizing public money. It is no accident 
that even European Community Law has no provisions on state ownership, and as regards 
public money it also tends to rather focus on budget indicators. 
1. The History of Administering Public Wealth
In the course of history there have been various reasons for establishing state wealth, and 
even the guiding principles for administering it have been rather diverse. 
In Antiquity and in the Middle Ages no public wealth in its current form existed yet, 
even though Roman Law did already recognize the Caesar’s public wealth, which was, as 
regards both its legal status and management, clearly distinguished in the treasury from the 
Caesar’s private wealth.
In Europe the separation of the monarch’s private wealth from public wealth only 
ensued at the end of the 18th century. The monarch’s wealth was then managed, controlled 
and supervised by organs distinctly detached from one another and by persons personally 
designated for the task by the monarch. The legal regulation for administering the monarch’s 
wealth had not yet been created, and neither had the management of its various types, land 
property, the regalia, and tax based revenues been set apart yet.
 
1.1. The Issues of State Ownership Efﬁ ciency
Ever since the economic system of capitalism evolved, the American and European models 
have taken different courses of development. In America no state ownership developed, 
whereas in Europe, the scope of state ownership was continually widened.
On the European continent the state’s entrepreneurial wealth, in addition to treasury 
wealth, evolved in the age of liberal capitalism. In America the state had not run any 
business enterprises, which even in England could not be considered prevalent.
Liberal capitalism developed a new type of state ownership in Europe as a result of the 
appearance of infrastructural public services. Early on infrastructural public services, such 
as postal and telegram services, the railway, due to their high level of capital demand, by all 
means, needed state subsidies, which on the European Continent ﬁ nally led to the state 
operation and the state ownership of public services. Hence, the creation of state property 
on Continental Europe in the public service sector was closely related to the acknowledgement 
of the state’s caretaking function.
In Continental Europe, infrastructural public services were operated in state monopoly, 
and it was a matter of debate whether public utilities, mostly afﬁ xed to some form of public 
wealth, ought to be state-operated or rather economic activities operated by private 
enterprises as well. The state, out of economic considerations, e.g. due to mass demand, 
would sometimes give public services into concession.
The central issue, however, was not yet related to whether state-owned public works or 
public service concessions were more efﬁ cient, but whether the public service ought to be 
governed by public law or private law regulations, and whether the concession agreement 
ought to contain public or private law elements. The broadening of the scope of public 
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service concessions was, however, a tacit acknowledgement of the conviction that business 
enterprises operated at higher efﬁ ciency.
In England no clear distinction was drawn between public and private law, for it was 
public corporations, bodies independent of public administration organs that controlled 
state-owned public services. Certain efﬁ ciency requirements could already be traced in the 
operation of public corporations, since public utilities were consciously withdrawn from the 
control of the rigid and red-tape dominated public administration, as public utilities were 
increasingly regarded as self-governing bodies requiring a large degree of independence in 
reaching their business decisions.
The state in America facilitated the creation of infrastructural public services by 
subsidizing privately owned public utility companies. Privately owned land was only 
expropriated to allow the state to grant land to railway construction companies. The US 
Constitution, rather early on, already at the end of the 19th century, would afford the federal 
government authority to extensively regulate economic activities with public signiﬁ cance, 
yet it still did not create a constitutional basis for nationalization, which therefore never 
became common practice. In America, thus, no state ownership of land, public utilities, and 
entrepreneurial wealth evolved.
Economic ideology in America has ever since the beginnings been of the viewpoint 
that state property is inevitably of low efﬁ ciency in both the business and the public sectors. 
All this is closely related to the traditions of decentralized US public administration and the 
American approach averse to centralized governance. Infrastructural public services have 
since the very beginnings been privately owned business enterprises, which received 
exclusive rights from the state, and which, due to the public nature of service provision and 
the absence of market competition were subjected to state regulation.
The communist economic system triggered the most drastic changes in state ownership. 
In the full nationalization of privately owned entrepreneurial wealth, war communism saw 
an instrument of centralizing assets. Yet, when the forthcoming collapse of the economy 
resulting from having eliminated market institutions could no longer be denied, the 
communist economic management was forced to compromise. In order to ensure economic 
efﬁ ciency, it returned small entrepreneurial property to private ownership and created 
collective ownership in agriculture. In the plan command economy state companies attained 
a certain level of economic independence through the application of the system of 
independent accounting.
The economic ideology of communism saw in the exclusive state ownership of 
entrepreneurial wealth a chance to create an increasingly productive economic system. Yet, 
as it soon became apparent, the proﬁ tability of state enterprises was in reality by no means 
related to their economic performance. Factors, such as planning and political bargain 
mechanisms were to replace the economic judgment earlier exercised by the market. 
Reforms to the communist economic system aimed at a greater economic independence 
of state companies, which they hoped to achieve through a looser control exercised by 
public administration, in order to, in turn, also increase the company’s efﬁ ciency.
These reforms turned out to be furthest reaching in Hungary. The 1968 reform created 
a system of economic regulators, which differently from the plan command system, did not 
directly determine the economic activity of state companies, but centrally developed an 
incentive system. The organizational-legal reform of 1984 withdrew the competence of 
exercising property rights from public administration bodies that controlled state companies, 
and conferred them onto the self-governing bodies of companies. However, a self-governing 
body composed of company employees had no ownership interests, nor any managerial 
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experience or approach. Neither could a state company organized and managed in a uniﬁ ed 
manner operate as a business enterprise. 
Therefore, Hungarian reforms aiming at reforming economic control did not manage 
to establish an interest-directed system that could have brought about signiﬁ cant changes in 
economic efﬁ ciency, which proved that in the absence of market institutions, e.g. economic 
associations, market competition, the dominance of private property, the efﬁ cient operation 
of state companies was illusory. 
In the ﬁ rst half of the 20th century various categories of public wealth were 
distinguished in Europe. The state’s private wealth, as a private enterprise, was to be 
responsible for the state’s revenue-making activity. Treasury wealth used to be connected to 
the public responsibilities of infrastructural public services, such as roads, public utilities, 
networks, or to the activity of state organizations, public buildings and institutions. Assets 
in public use constituted part of treasury wealth, e.g. natural assets, like rivers, lakes, the 
seaside, or artiﬁ cially created assets, like parks and public areas. 
At the beginning of the 20th century in each one of the European states a process of 
nationalization commenced, increasing the state’s entrepreneurial wealth and state 
ownership related to public services. The increasing ratio of state wealth was closely related 
to this process, whereby the state, in order to resolve market difﬁ culties, would intensively 
interfere with economic processes. Public utility wealth attached to public services was 
nationalized so as to achieve and maintain tighter state control over public services.
Nationalization would continue following the Second World War, too, especially in the 
United Kingdom, where the British Labour Party forming the government in 1945 
nationalized the majority of industrial and infrastructural public services. As a result of the 
nationalization the ratio of state property in the public sector grew to over 70 per cent, and 
in the industry to over 30 per cent. Following the Second World War the application of the 
Keynesian economic policy became widespread in Western European countries, where state 
property was an instrument in the hands of the welfare policy. At the time, the nationalization 
of public services served as a safeguard for ensuring access to public services, the scope of 
which was further extended by welfare institutions.
From the 1980s onwards the neoliberal economic policy would also bring about a 
signiﬁ cant change in state ownership.
In the US, neoliberalism subjected public services to market mechanisms, believing 
that the removal of the limitations on entering the market as well as market competition 
would result in a higher efﬁ ciency functioning of public services, than public administration 
regulations had guaranteed them when they were still considered to be natural monopolies. 
The issue of ownership was not a matter of debate in the US, since infrastructural public 
services functioned as business enterprises, whereas local public services–such as rubbish 
collection, the maintenance of public areas–were not linked to assets available for 
privatization. 
In contrast, in the 1980s economic efﬁ ciency was not expected to be achieved by 
market competition in Europe, but by privatising state-owned companies. Proﬁ t-orientation 
was believed to lead to more efﬁ cient functioning than state ownership had done, since the 
state must, by its nature, be a poor manager. In the 1980s in most Western European 
countries the state’s entrepreneurial wealth was sold through privatisation. The United 
Kingdom was at the vanguard of this movement, where privatisation was not constrained 
by law, and where even the majority of the infrastructural public utility companies changed 
hands. In most countries on the Continent state ownership was protected by constitutional 
and legal regulations against the state’s privatising ambitions, and privatisation tended to 
take the form of concession. 
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Consequently, however, privatization, either through the sale of state wealth, or through 
granting the right of use, proved to be insufﬁ cient to provide a solution to the question of 
efﬁ ciency on its own, as long as monopoly positions were maintained. Furthermore, proﬁ t-
orientation would often lead to higher priced public services, than state ownership had done, 
for in the latter case the state, for political reasons, had more stake in taking consumer 
interests into account as well.
Neither did the competition sector’s tools modelled for competition supervision prove 
adequate to resolve the monopoly positions of the public sector, since competition 
supervision organs, in the absence of market prices, were not ﬁ tted to establish, whether the 
service fee was high or not, and were neither authorized, nor equipped to screen public 
utility companies.
The state did neither manage to fully enforce the efﬁ cient operation of public service 
companies through concession contracts. Despite the fact that the entitlement to concession 
is granted through tendering, and concession agreements may ensure the state the rights of 
pricing and quality control, a concession agreement can only difﬁ cultly be adjusted and 
amended to adapt to changes of the economy.
After about a decade’s delay, the European Union did eventually adopt the practice of 
liberalization common in the USA, and even made a policy statement that public services 
could not be efﬁ ciently performed when provided by state-owned, monopolized public 
utility companies. Community Law therefore extended the rules of competition law to 
public services, and forbade EU member states to ensure a monopoly status to public service 
companies. The removal of the limitations on entry to the market and establishing market 
competition have obliged the owner or user of a public works company or network within a 
given public service provision branch to allow access to any enterprise joining the market.
Neither in the competition sector, nor in the public service sector does Community 
Law regulate the ratio of state ownership. Maintaining the state ownership of public utility 
companies and networks has no relevance, since any one enterprise is eligible to entering 
the market, and to having access to public service provision. In other words, in the European 
Union emphasis has shifted from the choice between public or private ownership to market 
competition with a view to achieve efﬁ ciency.
1.2. Forms of Public Money Management
In Europe, towards the end of the 19th century, so as to combat corruption, the system of 
state accounting was established, with detailed legal regulations to govern budget 
management and supervisory institutions. Lawful and regular operation was then the main 
guiding principle for utilizing budget resources. Cash-ﬂ ow oriented accounting supervision 
was suitable to enforce proper revenue and expense regulations.
It was only in the 1980s, owing to neoliberalism in America that the issue arose of 
what efﬁ ciency the state could display when performing its functions beyond simply 
complying with the regulations, in other words, whether the money incurred for delivering a 
task was proportionate to the size of the task and what efﬁ ciency state organs could perform 
when discharging their responsibilities.
American neoliberalism, which aimed at draining fewer resources from the economy 
and to correspondingly reduce budget expenses, developed the system of New Public 
Management which described more efﬁ cient methods for discharging state functions, i.e. 
with lower costs and a larger output. A smaller and cheaper state spending less public money 
can also be achieved by making the operation of public administration itself more efﬁ cient. 
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This has twofold implications: the more efﬁ cient discharge of public administration duties 
on the one hand, and the more efﬁ cient functioning of public administration bodies on the 
other. 
New Public Management ﬁ nds business principles the appropriate means to achieve 
higher efﬁ ciency in performing public functions. Thus, it confers the responsibility of 
discharging the duties of a public administration body onto business enterprises. These state 
functions–as opposed to public services–cannot be discharged in a competitive environment, 
therefore market competition is replaced by tendering, meant to guarantee that the most 
competitive enterprise win the right of deliverance. The business enterprise performing a 
thus ‘outsourced’ state function is expected to enforce a customer-centred approach, and 
through its proﬁ t-orientation to achieve an optimum of expenses.
There are numerous dissenting opinions as regards where the boundaries of the 
outsourcing of state functions can be drawn, whether only the functional activities 
complementary to the operation of public administration bodies, or whether also fundamental 
public functions can be subjected to business principles. Today there are numerous examples 
of the latter, as well: in many instances business enterprises operate prisons, implement 
court decisions, carry out food safety management and tax collection. 
According to a vision of developing cooperation between the public and private sectors 
certain state responsibilities ought to be discharged jointly by public administration bodies 
and business enterprises, in the course of which cooperation they could mutually count with 
the other’s advantages. This arrangement has been successfully applied in completing state 
investments. Public Private Partnership (PPP) investments offer the state access to ﬁ nancial 
resources, while allow business enterprises access to orders placed by the state. A novel 
feature of the PPP construction, in comparison to concession, is that the investment is 
completed jointly by state organs and business enterprises, often in the framework of a 
business association. The risks of the investment are born by the business enterprise, in 
exchange for which it is entitled to utilize the facility created by the investment, or may 
require to be paid a lease by the state.
With respect to outsourcing and PPP investments, it is actually the contract concluded 
by the state and a business enterprise that will determine whether the application of business 
principles will indeed lead to higher efﬁ ciency. Considering that the compulsory content of 
these contracts–unlike in the case of concession agreements–is not speciﬁ ed by civil law, a 
lot depends on to what extent state bodies can assert state interests during business 
negotiations. The danger of corruption is also increased, since state supervisory bodies can 
only exercise posterior supervision of these contracts, while having to scrutinize business 
decisions. It is not accidental that the European Union has developed the practice of 
concluding PPP investment contracts along principles and model contracts, which already 
offer the state guidance on how to conclude the contract while seeking the most efﬁ cient 
solution. Another EU expectation is that once the contract has been signed an independent 
court of auditors should supervise its implementation according to well-determined 
principles, so as to ensure the efﬁ cient use of public money. 
New Public Management has proposed the direct application of management principles 
even in the operation of public administration bodies to assure a more efﬁ cient utilization of 
public money. Such principles are, for example: a performance and quality oriented budget, 
the application of democratic leadership methods, providing incentive to public employees 
and measuring their performance. Public administration responsibilities are now discharged 
in accordance with the public policy approach in most developed countries. Public policy is 
in other words the implementation of public administration responsibilities, e.g. economy 
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development, or combating social problems along managerial principles, taking account of 
the given political and cultural conditions. The public policy approach nevertheless does 
focus on efﬁ ciency, and develops the relevant methods for achieving it, such as determining 
strategic goals, precisely deﬁ ning the task, working out alternative solutions, and ﬁ nally 
assessing the execution of the decision according to performance and efﬁ ciency. 
There were no limitations on applying New Public Management in the American 
public administration system, for it has since the very beginnings applied the principles of 
company management, has not laid great emphasis on differences between public and 
private administration, and has not found legal regulations essential for the operation of 
public administration. The application of a public policy which lays a great emphasis on 
managerial principles inevitably provides sufﬁ cient incentive, even in the absence of legal 
obligations, to public administration bodies, hence no special legal regulations are needed 
to be in place. 
Contrarily, in public administration systems on the European Continent, where the 
traditions of centralized and legally regulated public administration have evolved, the 
application of business principles created a challenge. It was not clear how business 
principles could be applicable. The values of the Weberian model of public administration 
tend to lay emphasis on legality and serving the public interest rather than on efﬁ ciency. 
Many ﬁ nd the business approach contrary to Weberian values, since they identify business 
principles with the proﬁ t aspirations of business enterprises.2
In the Weberian model public administration is legally overregulated, and the greatest 
expectation towards public administration bodies is that the norms pertaining to the 
competences, functions and procedures of the body should be fully complied with. The 
traditional instruments used by European public administration are controlling, direction, 
supervision, monitoring, individual decision making, normative direction, which tools, due 
to legal regulation, have attained a level of extreme sophistication. The legal regulation of 
public administration has thus not much in common with efﬁ ciency requirements, apart from 
wanting to regulate those, too. All this, of course, does not mean that legal regulations 
would be contrary to efﬁ ciency considerations, or that they would make them superﬂ uous. 
In Western-European states management principles have in many instances been successfully 
applied in public administration.3
Public money can neither be adequately utilized without the most fundamental 
principles being regulated by the constitution and laws, nor without parliament exercising 
its supervisory function. New expectations for the efﬁ cient utilization of public money have 
been formulated, too, the enforcement of which can suitably be ensured by legal regulations. 
Such are transparency, publicity, and accountability in the utilization of public money. 
These requirements can be fulﬁ lled by legal regulations establishing institutions. An 
independent supervisory body’s competences ought also to be extended to the supervision 
of efﬁ ciency. Their traditional supervisory function ought to be transformed into a 
2 Lőrincz, L.: A kormányzás modernizációja (The Modernization of Governance). Új Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2006) 11, 650–652.
3 Hajnal, Gy.: Hatékonyság és teljesítmény az Európai Unió országainak közigazgatásában 
(Efﬁ ciency and Performance in the Public Administration of European Union Countries). In: Lőrincz, 
L. (ed.): Közigazgatás az Európai Unió tagállamaiban. Összehasonlító közigazgatás (Public 
Administration in the Member States of the European Union. Comparative public administration). 
Budapest, 2006, 469–475.
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consultative relationship aiming at cooperation. The outcome of supervision must be 
publicized and the legal consequences of abuses be determined. 
Many people are apprehensive of applying business principles in public administration, 
partly, because facts have clearly shown that this approach has not anywhere yet resulted in 
a cheaper state, since the size of public administration has thereby not been reduced. Nor do 
they ﬁ nd the elaboration of methods which could objectively measure efﬁ ciency feasible.4
Others would make the discharge of public administration responsibilities cheaper and 
more efﬁ cient by e-government alongside deregulating legal regulations. Nowadays the 
expenses of the discharge of public administration functions would incur for the national 
economy are quantiﬁ able, and if they largely exceed the acceptable limit the wastefulness 
of public administration in spending public money cannot be denied. If, however, public 
administration bodies were burdened with less red tape, i.e. did not unnecessarily have to 
issue permissions, supervise processes or keep records, or could do so more simply and 
more cheaply, through electronic means, the size of public administration could also be 
reduced. 
The efﬁ ciency of utilizing public money is also greatly endangered by corruption, 
which often results in manifold costs incurred by state investments, orders placed by the 
state, or a loss of wealth through privatization. Surveys conducted by international 
organizations stress that there is a strong correlation between corruption, the level of an 
economy’s development and the extent of democratic functioning, as well as the strength of 
the non-governmental sector. The European Union has even laid down rules regarding what 
kind of an institutional system ought to be established.
2.  The Management of State Property, the Efﬁ ciency of Public Money Utilization 
in Hungary
2.1. State Property and Privatization
By the end of the 1980s state and cooperative property had ceased to be of an exclusive 
nature. In the so-called second economy–in the market of small enterprises–and also within 
the framework of state companies and cooperative farms, various kinds of enterprises 
developed, in spite of which development, however, state and cooperative ownership 
remained prevalent. 
The process of privatization started in 1989, when self-governing state companies that 
had been granted the right of ownership were authorized to decide about their own 
transformation and privatization. From 1991 onwards privatization was drawn under tight 
state control, and was implemented by privatization organizations under government 
direction. 
Hungarian privatization is not easy to assess as regards efﬁ ciency, since hardly any 
reliable data and analyses are available. The only ﬁ gures so far publicized are based on the 
surveys of the Hungarian Court of Auditors, in accordance with which the loss of state 
wealth constituted 40%, out of which the loss of value amounted to 10%, and the loss 
through corruption to 30%. 
4 Lőrincz, L.: A kormányzás modernizációja. op. cit. 645–646, and Lőrincz, L.: Közigazgatási 
reformok: mítoszok és realitás (Public Administration Reforms: Myths and Reality). Közigazgatási 
Szemle, 1 (2007) 2–3, 54–55.
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There are counter arguments claiming that the wealth of state companies was not 
assessable at the beginning of the 1990s for various reasons. On the one hand, the accounting 
was not carried out in line with market economy requirements, on the other, there was 
oversupply in the market of communist countries, and furthermore, the loss of wealth would 
anyhow, regardless of privatization, have taken place owing to unfavorable processes in the 
world economy. References are also made to the small number of corruption cases that 
were revealed.5
Surveys conducted by the Court of Auditors go against the above claim, purporting 
that privatization in Hungary was one of the main areas of state corruption.
Undeniably no legal remedy could be sought against privatization decisions. In the 
early stage of spontaneous privatization this was due to the fact that it was the self-governing 
companies, the practitioners of ownership rights that decided about privatization, whereas, 
later on ownership rights were conferred onto the State Privatization Agency under 
government control and later on to the state agency, APV Rt. (APV Shareholding 
Company).
There was, in fact, no control available by seeking legal remedy against privatization 
decisions at the time of spontaneous privatization, since self-governing companies, as those 
entitled to exercise ownership rights decided about privatization, and later on ownership 
rights were conferred onto the State Privatization Agency and then to the State Privatization 
and Asset Management Agency, APV Shareholding Company. 
Therefore, no external supervisory organs were in place to oversee the operation of 
privatization organizations. Not the economic rationality, but only the accounting aspects of 
privatization decisions were at that time subjected to the scrutiny of the State Privatization 
and Asset Management Agency. Parliamentary committees were, by nature, unsuitable to 
rule on complex business matters. Additionally, the supervisory committee in the State 
Privatization and Asset Management Agency, APV Rt. was also constituted of members 
delegated by political parties. 
Hence, it is not surprising that even though from early on privatization processes have 
been overshadowed by corruption, only few corruption cases have been publicly disclosed. 
Since the beginnings of the 1990s attempts have been made at reforming privatization 
in order to ensure the property acquisition of Hungarian small and medium sized enterprises. 
Such attempts included the introduction of ‘use privatization’, the legal regulation of 
privatization techniques and economic priorities, or the separation of state wealth retained 
long term in state ownership, the management of which was entrusted ﬁ rst to AP Rt. (AP 
Shareholding Company or State Privatization Agency), and then to APV Shareholding 
Company or the State Privatization and Asset Management Agency). The privatization of 
the public service sector was then fundamentally implemented in accordance with the 
Concession Act, which ensured the right of use to those entitled to concession instead of 
selling state property. 
Even despite the reforms executed, no privatization organization, made up of experts, 
functioning independently of the government was established, which would have been 
overseen by external supervisory organs, exercising in merit supervision to ensure economic 
rationality and legality. Thus, privatization was implemented along political and not 
efﬁ ciency considerations.
5 Mihályi, P.: A magyar privatizáció enciklopédiája 1989–1997 (The Chronicle of Hungarian 
Privatization: 1989–1997). Budapest, 1988, 397–398.
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In some people’s opinion it is questionable whether even a mention of the economic 
efﬁ ciency of privatization could be made, since at the beginning of the 1990s most emphasis 
was laid on establishing the institutions of market economy, and thus privatization had to, 
by all means, in the shortest possible period of time be performed, even though there was 
no privatization strategy in place, and state companies were bound to be sold at a loss.6 
Expectations towards privatization are not easy to distinguish from political 
considerations and from the issue of economic rationality.
As regards the ratio of wealth remaining in state ownership, in one opinion, the practice 
of liberal economies, restricting the scope of state ownership to treasury wealth is alien 
from Hungarian traditions, whereas in another opinion, the state is by nature a poor manager, 
implying that the entrepreneurial wealth of the state should be privatized. These viewpoints 
tend to be dependent on party afﬁ liation. 
The privatization of the energy sector did not take place through concession at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but through the sale of public utility wealth to foreign investors. 
This seems to prove the assumption that if the state sells its strategically important 
assets, it will not be in the position to assert the interests of the national economy as well as 
it ought to. Energy prices will become a constant political issue, and although it is hard to 
decide whether they are low or high compared to world market prices, it is nevertheless a 
tell-tale sign that despite a European Commission recommendation, in Hungary no 
independent, elected, ﬁ nancially autonomous price-regulating body, having the authority of 
in merit supervision, operating according to a transparent and clear procedural system has 
yet been established. The Hungarian Energy ofﬁ ce–which cannot be claimed to be 
independent of the government, moreover, it is indeed a government agency−has only the 
right of proposal regarding pricing, actual decisions are made by the Minister of Economy. 
Earlier pricing issues in the energy sector were decided in the framework of background 
bargaining between the government and the privatized public utility company, then a 
conﬁ dential matter, although later on stipulated by a government decree. 
However, the state did manage to abolish the right of motorway operation, even if only 
by compensation, when it was not functioning successfully as a public service, and did 
manage to conclude a new agreement.
The theory of the state being a poor manager is also proved by the corruption cases 
connected to transport companies and the postal services which are even now in state and 
local government ownership. 
The debate on whether state or private ownership is more beneﬁ cial with respect to 
infrastructural public services will soon be history as a result of market liberalization. 
Political considerations have clearly replaced the aspects of economic efﬁ ciency, when 
privatization took place in order to increase budget revenues or to assist the wealth 
acquisition of political circles favoured by the government. If our starting point is that 
privatization is only justiﬁ able when state wealth is operated better by a business enterprise, 
we must conclude that the privatization solutions were contrary to these objectives. No 
reliable ﬁ gures exist regarding what the ratio of those is who became beneﬁ ciaries of 
privatization due to their political afﬁ liation. 
6 Sárközy, T.: A korai privatizációtól a késői vagyontörvényig. Az állami tulajdon jogának 
fejlődése (From Early Privatization to the Late Asset Act–The development of the Right of State 
Ownership). Budapest, 2009, 73.
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It is clearly a matter of economic policy and not a matter of economic efﬁ ciency 
whether it is foreign or domestic enterprises that ought to be favoured by privatization. One 
argument is that in the absence of Hungarian entrepreneurs with a strong capital, the 
involvement of foreign capital and management know-how was greatly needed at the 
beginning of the 1990s, whereas a counter argument is that this strengthened the tendencies 
of globalization contrary to the interests of the national economy.
In the course of privatization the requirement of economic efﬁ ciency was set against 
the requirement of justice.
One standpoint held that according to the principle of justice everyone should receive 
an equal share from the state wealth. The principle of justice justiﬁ ed the rejection of 
voucher privatization as the main type of privatization, claiming that it would split state 
wealth and could be used for speculation purposes. In its stead, schemes, which offered 
some kind of discount to individuals and small enterprises purchasing state wealth were 
introduced.
With respect to re-privatization a conﬂ ict of the following three principles: efﬁ ciency, 
justice and constitutionality also arose. According to the standpoint that emphasized 
efﬁ ciency considerations, re-privatization means an outpour of revenues from the budget 
without adequate performance in exchange, therefore it is economically unreasonable. It 
was later on proved that the re-privatization of arable land also worsened economic 
efﬁ ciency, since in the absence of capital no operable family-run farms could develop, thus 
also contributing to the decline of agriculture. The law interpretation by the constitutional 
court–which could theoretically have overwritten other considerations–could eventually not 
lead to precise and consistent legal decisions, rather looked for legal solutions suitable for a 
political compromise. 
The Constitution makes a legally assessable statement as regards state ownership, 
claiming that the scope of exclusive state property is speciﬁ ed by law. Consequently, it is 
simple majority laws that govern state ownership, which can be amended any time at a 
government party’s or government initiative. Hence, privatization, has no constitutional 
limitations beyond the binding limitation dictated by laws.
In the past twenty years the ratio of state wealth has decreased not only as regards the 
state’s entrepreneurial wealth, but also its treasury wealth. At the beginning of the 1990s 
numerous public services were non-negotiable, such as agricultural land. Earlier on, the Act 
establishing the Hungarian State Holding Company grouped the majority of assets falling 
under the National Land Fund’s authority among the state’s entrepreneurial wealth, thereby 
making them open to privatization. The scope of strategically important assets was also 
immensely reduced to its third within twenty years. 
2.2. The Management of Public Money and the Efﬁ ciency of the Economy
It is common knowledge that in Hungary the state drains many resources from the economy 
in the form of public burdens, though it is also true that the burdens of the underground 
economy and of multinational companies are largely compensated by state subsidy. At the 
same time public administration is huge, red tape dominated and of low efﬁ ciency. Instead 
of implementing efﬁ ciency oriented reforms, the methods used for achieving efﬁ ciency in 
public administration have so far only been attempts to abolish certain public administration 
organizations and to apply administrative methods, redundancies and hiring freezes.
The application of managerial principles is still entirely absent in the operation of 
public administration. Public administration is legally overregulated, while legal regulations 
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fundamentally focus on the operational, competence, and procedural rules of public 
administration bodies, whereas the requirements of efﬁ ciency play no role. Additionally, the 
administrational culture is also of a low standard.
State functions are also performed at a low standard by public administration.
The infrastructural public services still run under the authority of the state, are of poor 
standard, whereas the public utility companies in state and local government ownership 
utilize public money in a wasteful manner. In recent years, there have obviously been 
concrete aspirations to restrict the scope of transport company services, while increasing the 
fee of these services. Neither has there been a solution found for the efﬁ ciency issues of 
health service ﬁ nancing. Only administrative measures have been taken to reduce the 
number of beds, to close down hospitals and restrict the scope of services. At the same 
time, as regards the increase of afﬁ xes, sufﬁ cient action has been taken to extend them to 
everyone and to collect them efﬁ ciently.
On the basis of all this, however, the image of a state-owned public service model 
seems to be unfolding combining neoliberal principles that encourage self-care with a high 
level of the public burdens of welfare states, clearly showing that the state can only utilize 
public money at very low efﬁ ciency.
While the state discharges its responsibilities, it extensively applies business principles, 
but in most cases not successfully.
State investments are known to incur the manifold of the real costs, or are completed 
in areas that have no justiﬁ cation with respect to economic rationality.
The outsourcing of the professional responsibilities of public administration organs is 
often abused to utilize public money for private purposes by concluding feigned contracts. 
The same purpose is served by using public foundations and public beneﬁ t companies 
to discharge state responsibilities. Financing in these cases is based on individual decisions, 
and as the investigations of the Hungarian State Audit Ofﬁ ce have established, often no in-
merit performance is delivered in exchange. 
Frequently the environment in which development resources are utilized does neither 
enhance efﬁ ciency. Regions with an elected body, equipped with political and decision 
making authority, determined in accordance with Community Law cannot be created due to 
the two-thirds majority legislation requirement. In their place centrally directed development 
councils are in operation, having no real authority. Although no reliable data are available, 
there is a high level of likelihood that instead of efﬁ ciency requirements party political 
considerations matter most in utilizing development resources.
There are several reasons, why public money is spent at such low efﬁ ciency.
–  A decisive factor is probably the standard of legal regulations. There is no uniﬁ ed 
legal regulation in place for involving business enterprises in discharging state 
responsibilities.
The Concession Act provides for the rules, concession tenders and the conclusion of 
concession contracts in a detailed manner. The public procurement act, although it is also 
thoroughly detailed, contains numerous and substantial legal gaps, making it possible for a 
pre-selected applicant to become the winner, or simply to avoid the public procurement 
procedure. Legal regulations for most of the recently completed PPP investments, and for 
outsourcing public administration responsibilities are totally missing, or to be more precise 
it is provisions of the civil code governing the conclusion of contracts in general that are in 
place.
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The presence of legal regulations itself does not directly imply that there ought to be a 
close connection between legal regulations with detailed stipulations for guaranteeing an 
efﬁ cient utilization of public money, since even the most sophisticated statutory provisions 
can be evaded, if the legal environment and culture has a long standing tradition of not 
respecting laws, but rather evading them. 
–  According to international surveys, the extent of state corruption in Hungary already 
constitutes a serious obstacle to economic growth. Its main areas are privatization, 
orders placed by the state and development resources. Corruption typically takes 
place in the highest levels of politics and of public administration, within the 
framework of conﬁ dential relationships. This is largely facilitated by the political 
spoils system which increasingly penetrates the public administration personnel, 
thus the acquisition of public administration positions is a means of deepening 
contacts based upon corruption.
Corruption based on conﬁ dential relationships is hard to uncover, since the methods of 
leaving the person who discloses the corruption case unpunished, or disclosing the case 
with an anonymous report cannot be applied here. Therefore most probably the cases that 
have so far been revealed might well just be the tip of the iceberg.
The political elite has apparently no interest in creating a system of anti-corruption 
institutions and has not even established one yet. 
– The requirement of accountability has neither been set. 
The State Audit Ofﬁ ce has not only been delegated the power of legality supervision 
by the Constitution, but the requirements of ‘justiﬁ ability, necessity, expedience and 
efﬁ ciency’ are also listed among efﬁ ciency considerations. Even though the State Audit 
Ofﬁ ce fully complies with its duties, its publicized reports also submitted to Parliament are 
left without any legal or factual consequence. Deciding whether state investments incurring 
the manifold of the real costs, or PPP contracts containing detrimental conditions for the 
state are actually the outcome of unprofessional performance or of corruption does not fall 
under the purview of the State Audit Ofﬁ ce, but rather under courts’ jurisdiction in criminal 
proceedings. Yet only in one instance so far has a State Audit Ofﬁ ce report resulted in 
initiating a criminal lawsuit.
Accountability is rendered difﬁ cult by laws, such as the glass pocket act, which yet 
again does not attach any legal consequence to wealth declarations not in harmony with 
lawful incomes. Neither do party ﬁ nancing regulations clearly deﬁ ne costs incurable for 
election campaigns, making it impossible for the State Audit Ofﬁ ce to compare campaign 
costs with money allocated from the budget. 
Apart from the State Audit Ofﬁ ce there is no other organ responsible for supervising 
public money which could be regarded independent. It is not accidental that the Government 
Supervisory Ofﬁ ce has so far not been able to detect an abuse to be disclosed in the 
operation of government organs. The Parliament’s ad hoc committees, as regards their 
organizations and composition, are not suitable for this purpose either. The same applies to 
the institution of the state secretary for public money management as well.
The judicial system, too, ought to play an important role in sanctioning abuses of 
public money utilization. Facts, however, show that the judicial system is not up to meeting 
this requirement. State corruption cases often last even ten years long with the eventual 
judgments totally defying the sense of justice. Often is the charge dropped despite obvious 
evidence, or no criminal proceeding is initiated in cases publicized by the State Audit Ofﬁ ce 
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and the media, even though the judicial bodies are ex ofﬁ cio obliged to launch these 
proceedings. In state corruption cases, judicial bodies no longer examine entanglements of 
leading politicians and senior public administration ofﬁ cials, not even when there is 
sufﬁ cient evidence, or when they nevertheless do, there is a strong likelihood of political 
revenge.
In summary it can be stated that:
–  In the public service sector the signiﬁ cance of the management of state property has 
largely decreased as a result of liberalization processes. The debate regarding 
whether state or private ownership was more efﬁ cient has lost its signiﬁ cance, since 
market competition seems to solve the question of efﬁ ciency. 
–  The American approach, New Public Management, has worked out the most varied 
methods for utilizing public money. Applying managerial principles has never been 
alien to American public administration based on business principles. In the 
Weberian model in Europe–despite the diverse traditions of public administration–
the business approach is in many respects realizable. 
–  In Hungary, it is strongly debatable whether efﬁ ciency requirements were indeed 
considered and met during the privatization of the state wealth, or else in what way 
they should have been. There is no constitutional limitation on the privatization of 
state wealth, therefore, the scope of state wealth has been drastically reduced. 
–  No institutional system ensuring the efﬁ cient utilization of public money has yet 
been established. Consequently, business principles have not been successfully 
applied, and state corruption has gained ground. Public administration is 
overregulated and managerial principles are totally absent. 
